Can guaranteed tax base formulas achieve either wealth neutrality or spending equality? (Accountability and education reform, part 2) by Daniel G. Swaine & with Lynn E. Browne
Facts
Can Guaranteed Tax Base Formulas
Achieve Either Wealth Neutrality or
Spending Equality? Part 2
By Daniel G. Swaine, with Lynn E. Browne
T
hree highly publicized events are forcing
Vermont state policymakers to reconsider
e wisdom of the revenue-sharing mechanism
that governs the local option portion of the
state’s recently enacted school finance reform, Act 60:
¯ Residents of the property-rich "gold" town of Stowe
sued the state, in Anderson et al. v. State of Vermont (1998),
claiming that Act 60 violated their constitutional right to the
"substantially equal" educational opportunity that was
stipulated by the state Supreme Court in Brigham et al. v.
State of Vermont (1997). Specifically; the plaintiffs argued that
the disincentives contained in the revenue-sharing mecha-
nism associated with the local option taxes allowed under
Act 60 would make educational spending in property-rich
"gold" towns significantly less than spending in the prop-
erty-poor towns, violating the wealth-neutrality principle that
was also stipulated in the Brigham decision. The court ruled
against the plaintiffs.
¯ Three property-rich towns, Dover, Searsburg, and
Whittingham, have withheld from the state their payments
of the statewide property tax enacted byAct 60, as well as the
revenue-sharing portion of their local option taxes.
¯ Some property-rich communities have threatened to
circumvent the revenue-sharing feature of the local option
taxes allowed under Act 60 by forgoing such taxes altogether
and encouraging their residents to make voluntary contribu-
tions to an educational foundation, which would then fun-
nel the money back to the schools in these communities.
In this issue of Fiscal Facts, we ask whether the
complaints of the property-rich towns are simply the normal
grumbling that could be expected as a result of the redis-
tributive feature of the reform, or whether they indicate
fundamental problems with the redistributive approach that
was chosen in Vermont - a guaranteed tax base (GTB)
system.~ We discuss three major points:
¯ the definition and measurement of spending
disparity and wealth neutrality,
¯ why a GTB system may not achieve wealth
neutrality, and
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The Design of Act 60
As discussed in the previous issue of Fiscal Facts (Fall/Winter 1998), the Brigham decision forced
policymakers in Vermont to enact legislation to meet two court mandates: wealth neutrality and substan-
tial equality in per-pupil spending. Courts have noted that differences in per-pupil spending across dis-
tricts are often correlated with differences in per-pupil property wealth. The absence of a correlation
between property wealth and spending is termed wealth neutrality. Court decisions that overturn school
financing systems commonly stipulate that subsequent reforms can pass constitutional muster only by
eliminating this correlation. Additionally, in cases such as Brigham that are brought on equal protection
grounds, once the court has determined that the existing system is not wealth neutral, the decision usually
stipulates that any reform must also achieve "substantial equality" in per-pupil spending.-’
In designing Act 60, Vermont policymal(ers attempted to satisfy both mandates. To achieve both
substantial equality in spending and wealth neutrality, the first tier of Act 60 provides for an identical
per-pupil grant of about $5,200 to all school districts. This grant is completely state-funded and pro-
vides about 80 percent of statewide school spending) A second tier of Act 60, designed to provide
about 20 percent ofstatewide school spending, allows local districts the option of adding on a local tax
in order to give districts some choice over school spending levels. To try to maintain wealth neutrality,
the local option property tax is operated as a guaranteed tax base (or GTB) system.
A GTB system guarantees that each community has an identical property tax base upon which to
leW its local option taxes. Property-rich communities remit the funds they collect in excess of what would
be raised by a typical cormmmity, via the state, to property-poor communities. The same school finance
experts who created the wealth-neutrality principle as a basis for school finance court cases also proposed
the GTB system as the primary means by which to achieve wealth neutrality. They assumed that achieving
wealth neutrality would leave only small, random differences in districts’ per-pupil spending.
Spending Disparities
Spending disparities exist as long as spending levels are not equal across districts. If the spending
levels for each district are arranged in ascending order (from smallest to largest), various measures can
be used to summarize the disparity in spending. One common measure is the range - the largest value
less the smallest. The range ratio is the largest value divided by the smallest value. Because both mea-
sures can be dramatically affected by extreme values, a restricted range may be preferable. A common
choice is the value of the 95th percentile district less the value of the 5th percentile district. The com-
parable restricted range ratio is the value of the 95th percentile district divided by the value of the 5th
percentile district.
For the state of Vermont in FY96, the restricted range ratio was 2.17 (the 95th percentile district
spent more than twice the level of the 5th percentile district), and the restricted range was $3,636. The
The first article to discuss price incentives in GTB systems and the unanticipated problems that result was by Martin Feldstein.
See his "Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education," The American Economic Review, March 1975, pp. 75-89.
The term "substantially equal" spending was borrowed from the well-known Serranov. Priestcase in California.The California
state Supreme Court stated that per-pupil spending could not vary by more than $100 across districts in 1976. In 1998 dollars,
this amount would be equal to approximately $250 per pupil.
The original flat grant figure that was typically quoted in the press is $5,000. This figure has been increased to $5,200, but it is
for net current expenditures, which includes all expenditures for education except transportation expenditures for students and
school construction. Regular program expenditures, the concept that we use throughout this article, subtracts expenditures for
special education from net current expenditures. We eliminate special education expenditures from consideration because of
the controversial problems that special education causes.
The restricted range ratio is calculated from actual data on regular program expenditures and takes into account the fact that the
foundation grant system was both partially equalizing and partially wealth neutralizing.
Each of the ten districts contains exactly 10 percent of statewide enrollment (i.e., a decile of students). The property wealth
level for each of the ten districts is statistically representative (i.e., a weighted average) of the property wealth levels of the
districts that make up the decile.
Please note that this assumption allows for negative state aid, or revenue recapture. If we were to plot the sloped line of Chart
1 along with the flat line of Chart 2 in a combined chart, then for each district, the vertical distance between the sloped and flat
lines would illustrate the amount of state aid that each district either receives or pays back to the state for redistribution.plaintiffs in the Brigham case were able to argue successfully
that these disparities in per-pupil spending were primarily
due to disparities in wealth; in other words, the system was
not wealth neutral.4
Wealth Neutrality: An ILlustration
To illustrate the principle of wealth neutrality, we have
created ten representative Vermont school districts with sig-
nificantly different levels of per-pupil property wealth,5 We
make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the
ten districts do not receive state aid for education. Second,
we assume that all ten districts levy the same property tax
rate (equal to the statewide average). These two assumptions
assure that differences in per-pupil property wealth across
districts are the only reason for per-pupil spending differ-
ences across districts - a system that is not wealth neutral by
construction. Chart 1 illustrates such a system. The squares
along the straight line show the per-pupil revenues that would
be raised (and spent) for these ten Vermont districts. Since
the line has a positive slope, the school financing system can
be said to exhibit a positive relationship between spending
levels and property wealth.
What would spending look like if the state were to dis-
tribute equalizing aid to the districts in order to render the
system wealth neutral? Again, we make two simplifying as-
sumptions. First, we assume that the state employs a GTB
system of aid that guarantees each community the same tax
base. Second, we assume that each town continues to tax at
the statewide average. Since property-rich towns raise more
money for the same (statewide average) tax rate than prop-
erty-poor towns, this means taking the additional property
revenues raised by the rich towns and giving them to the
poorer communities.6 The outcome is the flat line in Chart
2. There is no relationship between wealth and spending lev-
els; and because of our assumption about equal tax rates,
achievement of wealth neutrality also achieves perfectly equal
spending levels.
Now assume that factors other than wealth also affect
spending decisions and that these factors, collectively at least,
are not related to wealth. Thus, in the absence of state aid,
per-pupil spending would equal per-pupil property wealth
multiplied by a tax rate that deviates randomly (with respect
to wealth) from the statewide average. Local spending would
continue to exhibit a positive relationship to property wealth;
but as shown by the circles in Chart 1, the relationship would
be fuzzy, with spending levels randomly distributed around
the straight line.
Now assume the state redistributes property tax revenues
as before, employing a GTB system, so that each community
has, in effect, the same tax base. Also assume that each com-
munity continues to leW the same tax rate as before. The re-
sult is shown by the circles in Chart 2. Spending exhibits no
sta~dcalrelationship (i.e., no correlation) with wealth. How-
ever, since tax rates vary randomly around the state average,
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the flat (zero slope) line. Thus, spending levels in this wealth-
neutral system are no longer equal. The disparities displayed
in Chart 2 are relatively small; but if other factors were impor-
tant enough, a wealth-neutral redistribution system could still
leave a sizable degree of spending dispariW.
Measuring Wealth Neutrality
Because other factors besides wealth affect local spend-
ing decisions and cause tax rates to vary among districts, the
relationship between spending and property wealth is likely
to be much less clear than Chart 1 suggests. Statistical tech-
niques may be necessary in order to determine whether spend-
ing does, indeed, increase with wealth. A further complication
is that some of the other factors affecting spending/tax rates
may themselves be correlated with wealth. For example, per-
capita income may affect residents’ willingness to tax them-
selves to support school spending. In metropolitan areas,
income and wealth are often correlated, with higher-income
suburbs having relatively high property wealth. In contrast,
in rural or vacation areas, property wealth may be consider-
able because of vacation properties and agriculture and tim-
ber resources, but the incomes of the local residents, who
vote on school spending, may be quite low. In the former
case, the relationship between income and spending will re-
inforce the wealth-spending link, while in the latter it will
offset the tie to wealth.
In addition, to the degree that voters in different com-
munities have a common sense of what constitutes an ad-
equate or desirable level of expenditure per pupil, there will be
some breakdown in the tie between wealth and income. Prop-
erty-poor communities may impose higher tax rates to com-
pensate for their low tax bases, while property-rich communities
may levy very low tax rates because even these low rates yield
sufficient revenues to provide high-quality education.
In Vermont in FY96, property tax rates actually varied
inversely and nonlinearlywith property wealth. In other words,
property tax rates declined with wealth, and the effect was
more pronounced at high levels of wealth. The level of school
spending depended on the tax rate levied, the level of state
aid that a district received, and the level of wealth. If we con-
trol for the level of state aid that a district received, then the
resulting property-wealth / school-spending relationship
would take a form something like that shown in Chart 3.
Spending still increases with wealth, so the system is not wealth
neutral. However, according to our estimates, a 10 percent
increase in property wealth would increase spending by about
2-1/2 percent-- not 10 percent.7
G~FB Formulas and Local
Distriot Behavior
As discussed above, a pure GTB school aid formula guar-
antees all districts access to the same property tax base, effec-
tively redistributing property wealth - and tax revenues -
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munities maintain their former tax rates and if these tax rates
are uncorrelated with wealth, the link between spending and
wealth will be eliminated. However, if tax rates are them-
selves correlated with wealth, then spending will still be a
function of wealth. It will be a positive function if commu-
nities with more wealth have higher tax rates, and it will be a
negative function if property-rich communities have lower
tax rates - as was the case in Vermont. Thus, the switch to a
GTB could result in property-rich communities spending
less than property-poor communities.
Not only could the switch to a GTB system have such a
result, but it also actually provides an incentive in this direc-
tion. The switch to a GTB formula effectively changes the
price paid by the local district for education. A pure GTB
formula operates as a matching grant/tax, with the state pay-
ing a percentage of each dollar that property-poor districts
spend for education and demanding a portion of the funds
raised by property-rich districts. Because of the state match,
an additional dollar of educational spending costs less than
one dollar to districts receiving state aid, while districts sub-
ject to a tax pay more per dollar of spending.
The matching rates and their effects on the local price of
education can be illustrated with a simple example, using
three hypothetical districts: a poor district with a wealth level
ors 100,000, a rich district with a wealth level ors 1,000,000,
and a "median" district with a wealth level of $250,000.
If the state sets the GTB at $250,000, the matching rates
would be 60 percent for the poor district ((250 - 100)/250),
0 percent for the median district ((250 - 250)/250), and
-300 percent for the rich district ((250 - 1,000)/250).s Thus,
the price of an additional dollar of education would be 40
cents for the poor district, $1 for the median district, and $4
for the rich district.9
How does a change in the price of education alter the
behavior of a local school district? Just as a decrease in price
tends to cause consumers to demand more of a good, a de-
crease in the price of public goods like education also in-
creases the quantity demanded. Conversely, as we increase
the price of education (by reducing the matching rate or by
imposing a tax through revenue-recapture provisions), a
district’s demand for education declines.
Thus, a pure GTB system, which guarantees all commu-
nities access to the same property tax wealth, affects local school
spending behavior in two ways: through a wealth effect and
through a price effect. The wealth effect is intended and works
to neutralize the influence of wealth on spending. The price
effect is unintended and, by making education more costly in
property-rich communities, tends to discourage spending in
property-rich communities. Because the wealth effect and the
price effect operate simultaneously, the shift to a pure GTB
system may reverse the normal positive slope that character-
izes the property-wealth ! school-spending relationship, pro-
ducing an inverse relationship, as in Chart 4.
In Vermont, Act 60 provides all districts with a flat grant
of $5,200 per pupil for net current expenditures. This giant
achieves both wealth neutrality and spending equalization.
However, Act 60 also allows a local option add-on, which is
subject to a GTB formula for equalization. Under this for-
mula, the price of education spending funded by the local
option taxes is substantially higher for the property-rich towns
and very much higher for the "gold" towns. For districts in
the top decile of property wealth, the price of a dollar of edu-
cation is roughly three times the price for the median district.
Various studies of how education spending responds to
price suggest that a 1 percent reduction/increase in price will
lead to a 0.5 percent increase/reduction in spending. Such
estimates are valid only for relatively small changes in price,
and thus cannot be readily applied to the Vermont situation.
However, it seems clear that the large price increases faced by
Vermont’s property-rich communities are likely to be a pow-
erful disincentive to spending, and it is not surprising that
some communities have reacted as described at the begin-
ning of this article.
Implications and Conclusions
This analysis suggests two important policy implications:
¯ First, many court challenges to local school financing
are based on the equal protection clause of the state constitu-
tion. In these cases, once the court has determined that a
system is not wealth neutral, the court usually orders that the
reformed system must achieve substantial equality in per-
pupil school spending as well as wealth neutrality. However,
steps taken to achieve wealth neutrality do not necessarily
achieve spending equali9: Because many other factors affect
continued on page 12
7 Using actual Vermont data, we statistically estimated the nonlinear relation-
ship between property tax rates and property wealth, while controlling for
the state aid received by each district. Combining this estimated relationship
with a second nonlinear relationship that we estimated between state aid
and property wealth, we compute the wealth elasticity for the median wealth
district to be 0.265.This implies that a 10 percent increase in wealth would
increase per-pupil spending by 2.65 percent.
8 The state matching rate for a GTB formula is given by (GTB -W)/GTB, where
GTB is the guaranteed wealth level, andW is the district’s wealth level.
9 The local price of education is equal to (1 - m), where m is the state
matching rate. For the poor district, m is 0.6. For the median district, m is O.
For the wealthy district, m is -3.0.Across the Region
R eflecting a healthy economy litde affected by overseas economic turmoil, revenue
growth across the region remained robust as of the end of February 1999.
Responding to the strong revenue flows as well as to bulging cash reserves accumulated from past
budget surpluses, most New England states accelerated their spending.
The major issue registering on all state radar screens was the continuing problem of school
finance. Massachusetts and Vermont are implementing the school finance reform acts passed
recently in these two states. Connecticut is dealing with a new lawsuit, Johnson v. Rowland, filed in
the state courts in 1998. It asks the court to enforce the historic 1977 decision in Hortanv. Meskil£
as well as the 1985 decision in the follow-up suit, Horton v. MeskilllII. In Maine, discontent
among property-poor, rural school districts has caused the state to consider modifying its local aid
formula. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, suburban school districts are criticizing their states’
policy of distributing the lion’s share of local aid to financially strapped and relatively property-
poor communities. Finally, media attention has been focused on New Hampshire, where the
governor and the legislature have struggled to find a new way to fund public
education in light of the state Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in the case of Claremontv. Governor
etaL In late April, it appeared that a solution, involving a variety of new and increased taxes, had
been cobbled together.




Millions of Dollars Change
Connecticut 8,912.7 9,379.2 5.2
Maine 2,226.1 2,423.8 8.9
Massachusetts 16,111.0 16,902.5 4.9
New Hampshireb 1,222.1 1,342.9 9.9
New Hampshirec 1,222.1 2,066.9 69.1
Rhode Islandd 2,782.4 2,922.0 5.0
Vermonte 1,422.2 1,448.0 1.8
a Unless otherwise noted, includes general fund and transportation fund appropriations only.
b Excludes expenditure of federal grants and reimbursements.
Includes budgeted income from sweepstakes earmarked for foundation aid and special education.
e Includes Act 60 spending.
Sources: Official budget documents, state financial statements, and conversations with state budget officials.Six-State Review
Connecticut
Through the end of February, Connecticut collected
$4.6 billion in tax revenues, up 3.3 percent from the same
period last year. This was slightly ahead of the
administration’s forecast of 2 percent growth. Both per-
sonal income tax and sales tax collections led the way,
growing at rates of 6.6 percent and 6.0 percent, respec-
tively. Business and fuel tax collections fell by 7.2 per-
cent, slowing overall revenue growth. The decline in these
revenue sources is attributable to overseas economic prob-
lems and the continued phase-in of previously enacted
tax cuts. State officials had anticipated an even steeper
falloff. Although reventie growth is slower than the pace
set last year, if current trends continue, Connecticut should
realize a revenue surplus of about $112 million.
In early February, Governor John Rowland submit-
ted his F¥99 supplemental budget adjustments along with
his budget proposal for FY2000. For FY99 he would add
$59.1 million (a scant 0.7 percent) to the budget enacted
last June. For F¥2000 the governor proposed to spend
$9.4 billion out of own-source revenues, an increase of
$407.4 million (4.5 percent) over projected F¥99 expen-
ditures. Almost half (about $171 million) of this spend-
ing increase is targeted toward new education initiatives.
The governor proposed to spend $54 million to improve
early childhood education, $86 million to reduce racial
isolation in urban school districts, and $31 million for
increased local aid.
With close to $200 million in enacted tax cuts sched-
uled to take effect in FY2000, the governor proposed
only two relatively small additional tax cuts. First, he would
reduce the tax on hospitals by $15 million. Second, he
would bring the state’s personal income tax laws into con-
formity with the federal Internal Revenue Code by allow-
ing state income taxpayers to take tax credits for education.
The resulting revenue loss is estimated at $16 million.
In other fiscal developments, the recently filed school
finance suit, Johnson v. Rockland, 1998, has prompted a
special task force to recommend that the state increase its
share of local education expenditures from 42 percent to
50 percent. In early March, Superior Court Judge Julia
Aurigemma ruled against the plaintiffs in Shej~v. O’Neill
II. The plaintiffs had argued that the state was acting too
slowly in carrying out the state Supreme Court’s order in
Shefflto desegregate the schools. Judge Aurigemma ruled
that the state was acting expeditiously and that the plain-
tiffs had failed to wait a reasonable time before returning
to court.
Mai~e
Tax collections for Maine in the first eight months of
the FY99 budget cycle totaled $1.4 billion, up 5.4 per-
cent over the same period last year. On a same-tax com-
parison basis, total tax revenue growth would have been
7.1 percent for the period. However, on October 1, a re-
duction in the sales tax rate from 6 percent to 5.5 percent
took effect, costing the state an estimated $23.7 million
in revenue through February. Policymakers are consider-
ing another 0.5 percentage point cut in the sales tax as
part of the FY2000 budget. The bright spot for the state’s
revenue picture was income tax collections, which grew
! 1.2 percent during this eight-month period.
In early February, Governor Angus King submitted
his FY99 supplemental budget adjustment and a spend-
ing proposal for FY2000. For FY99, the governor pro-
posed a supplemental spending adjustment of $97.9
million, up 4.4 percent from the enacted FY99 budget of
$2.2 billion. For F¥2000, the governor proposed to spend
$2.424 billion, an increase of 4.3 percent ($99.8 million)
above the adjusted FY99 expenditure level. In total, the
proposed FY2000 budget would be 8.9 percent above the
enacted FY99 spending level. This sizable increase in
spending for FY99 through FY2000 would be partially
financed with the large budget surpluses that have accu-
mulated from past years. Two major spending initiatives
were included in the FY2000 budget proposal: an increase
of $27.9 million (4.3 percent) in funding for new local
education aid, and an increase of$18.2 million (12.8 per-
cent) in research and development funds for the Univer-
sity of Maine system.
One fiscal issue that has received a lot of attention is
the governor’s proposal to increase both the gas tax and a
special fuels tax by 5 cents per gallon, primarily to close
an estimated $38.3 million shortfall in the highway fund.
,~13ritlfl/,q~ltlttl~,r 1,90,0 7Readers of Fiscal Facts may have wondered why the official revenue
growth numbers that are published in Maine’s monthly Undedicated
Revenue Report do not match the numbers reported in newspaper accounts
and other published sources, including Fiscal Facts. The official state rev-
enue reports provide a snapshot of the revenue flows afterthe diversion of
certain revenues to special reserve accounts. Fiscal Facts and most other
sources report revenue flows before these diversions take place (i.e., they
report the actual revenues collected by the state).
Two specific revenue diversions were initiated in FY98, while a third
revenue diversion was added in FY99. The first diverts 5.1 percent of sales,
income, and corporate tax collections to a municipal revenue-sharing
account. The second diverts "excess" tobacco tax revenues to a tax relief
fund. Excess revenues are defined as those revenues from the tobacco tax
that were collected in excess of the old tax rate in effect prior to a doubling
of the tobacco tax rate in November 1997. This diversion of tobacco tax
revenues was made during the period from November 1997 to January 1999.
The tobacco tax and sales, income, and corporate tax revenue diversions
affect both FY98 and FY99 revenues.
The third diversion affects FY99 revenues only for the period from July
through October 1998. This final diversion is for the "excess" revenues
collected from the sales tax, that is, the difference between the revenues
that were collected at the 6 percent rate existing between July and October
and the revenues that would have been collected between July and
October had the new 5.5 percent rate been in existence. In order to adjust
the officially reported revenues to arrive at the actual revenues that were
collected by the state before these diversions, the amount of these
diversions must be computed and added back to the officially reported
figures. These additions are listed in the table below.
Undedicated Revenues vs. Tax Collections
State of Maine FY98 & FY99
Millio~s of Do/la~’s
Undedlcated Revenue Tobacco SalesTax Total Actual
Revenues Sharing Tax Excess Excess Adjustments Collections
FY98
Sales 546.4 29.4 29.4 575.8
Income 531.8 28.6 28.6 560.4
Corporate 58.4 3.1 3.1 61.6
Other 160.0 12.4 12.4 173.4
Total 1,297.6 61.1 12.4 73.5 1,371.1
F¥99
Sales 513.8 27.6 25.5 53.1 566.9
Income 591.1 31.8 31.8 622.9
Corporate 51.8 2.8 2.8 54.6
Other 174.1 26.4 26.4 200.5
Total 1,330.8 62.2 26.4 25.5 114.0 1,444.9The gas and fuels tax increase is estimated to provide about
$27.9 million of the spending gap. The remaining $10.4
million would be financed with budget surpluses that have
accumulated from past years. A second fiscal issue that
has received attention recently is a push by many of the
state’s relatively property-poor, rural school districts for a
change in the formula for distributing state education aid.
The rural districts want an increase in the amount of over-
all aid that is distributed as well as.a change in how the
aid is distributed. The legislature is considering proposals
to increase the share of state aid from 44 percent to 55
percent of education expenditures.
Massachusetts
Through the first eight months of FY99, tax revenues
showed no sign of an anticipated slowdown in economic
growth. During this period, the Commonwealth collected
$9.0 billion, up 7.7 percent from the same period one year
earlier. Collections continued running significantly ahead
of the flat growth projected by both Governor Paul
Cellucci’s administration and the Massachusetts Taxpay-
ers Foundation. Both income and sales tax collections
posted strong growth, up 6.7 and 11.2 percent, respec-
tively, from the same period one year ago. If revenue growth
were to continue at the current pace, the Commonwealth
would end the year with another $1 billion revenue sur-
plus. However, because many previously enacted tax re-
ductions are scheduled to take effect during the second
half of the fiscal year, the administration expects slower
revenue growth, with a surplus of about $300 million.
In January, Governor Cellucci submitted his annual
budget proposal. For FY99, the governor proposed a
supplemental spending increase of $508.3 million, up 3.2
percent from the budget enacted last June. If this increase
is approved, overall expenditures will increase 7 percent
during FY99. For FY2000, the governor proposed a $16.9
billion own-source spending budget, up $283.2 million,
or 1.7 percent, over adjusted FY99 expenditures.
Consistent with recent spending patterns, most of the
proposed FY2000 budget increase is allocated to educa-
tion, health care, and child care. State aid to education
would increase by $260 million to fund the last year of
education reform. About two-thirds of the state’s $300
million share of the settlement with tobacco companies
would be allocated to health care initiatives. The major
portion of this increase would fund an expansion of the
state’s Medicaid program. Finally, the governor’s budget
proposes an increase of $102 million in child care and
early education expenditt, res.
The governor’s budget proposal also includes two tax
cuts. First, the governor re-submitted his FY99 call for a
reduction in the income tax rate from 5.95 percent to 5
percent. When fully phased in four years from now, this
proposal would cost the Common~vealth about $1.4 bil-
lion per year in lost revenues. Second, the governor pro-
posed to reduce unemployment insurance tax rates for
employers by up to $200 million. The governor would
also like to change the method of calculating the unem-
ployment insurance tax rates on employer payrolls.
In June 1998, Congress passed a reauthorization of
the highway bill, providing federal funding for various
transportation projects across the nation. As expected,
Massachusetts was the only state to receive less federal
funding than it had previously enjoyed. From 1991
through 1998, Massachusetts received an average of $830
million annually, which helped to fund the Central Ar-
tery/Tunnel (CA/T) project. In the new bill, the Com-
monwealth will receive federal funding of about $528
million annually. The state will fnnd the $300 million
annual gap with grant anticipation notes -- short-term
bonds that anticipate excess federal funds after most of
the CA/T construction has been completed. This reduced
level of federal funding has put a financial squeeze on
many other capital spending projects. In order to restart
these projects, the governor proposed to use the entire
FY99 budget surplus for the one-time funding of certain
high-priority projects.
New Hampshire
Tax collections totaled $669.9 million for the first
nine months of FY99, representing a 6.6 percent increase
over the same period last year. This was significantly above
the 3.5 percent increase that forecasters had predicted.
The state’s two largest taxes, the business profits tax and
the business enterprise tax, exhibited healthy revenue
growth, with combined revenues increasing to $175.3
million, up 5.2 percent from FY98. Meals and room tax
revenues increased to $105.8 million, up 7.1 percent from
a year earlier. If revenue growth continues at this pace for
the last three months of the fiscal year, the state will real-
ize a revenue surplus of $38.1 million.
In early February, Governor Jeanne Shaheen submit-
ted a supplemental spending adjustment for FY99 along
with her budget proposal for FY2000. Snpplemental ap-
propriations for FY99 would increase spending by $27.7
million (up 2.2 percent). For FY2000, the governor pro-posed own-source spending of $2.067 billion, up $817
million (or 65.4 percent) over adjusted FY99 spending
levels. These proposed spending levels and growth rate
figures include the recently enacted $825 million school-
financing solution to the state Supreme Court’s decision
in Claremont v. Governor et al.
The legislature’s attempt to craft a solution dominated
this legislative session. The solution that was finally en-
acted into law on May 1 involves a mix of taxes - it estab-
lishes a uniform statewide property tax of $6.60 per $1000;
$42 million and $90 million. At a funding level of $825
million, the state will finance approximately 62 percent
of current educational expenditures.
In addition to the new school-funding package, the
F¥2000-2001 budget proposal highlights include:
¯ an increase of $40 million (8.2 percent) in aid to
cities and towns,
¯ an increase of $7.5 million (5.0 percent) for the
University of New Hampshire system, and
¯ an increase of $16.5 million in capital spending
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it increases the business profits tax from 7 to 8 percent; it
increases the business enterprise tax from 0.25 to 0.5 per-
cent; it increases the property sales tax from $5 to $7.50
per $1000; it establishes a new 8 percent tax on car rent-
als - and it earmarks most of the money ($40 million)
from the state’s expected $43 million annual funding from
the national tobacco settlement.
This mix of revenues is projected to raise between $630
and $680 million per year. Adding in the current state aid
figure of$101 million brings total state financing to some-
where between $730 and $780 million. These revenues
will be distributed as a block grant to local school districts
and provide an average of $4,220 per-pupil. However, since
the total cost of the state funding mechanism is pegged at
$825 million, the state must find additional revenues to
cover an estimated revenue shortfall of somewhere between
aid to cities and towns to repair bridges that are
considered to be in critical condition.
Rhode Island
Through the end of February, Rhode Island collected
tax revenues of $943.2 million, a 5.4 percent increase from
the same period one year earlier. However, this strong
growth was skewed by an unexpected $20 million wind-
fall in inheritance and gift taxes. Excluding this windfall,
total tax revenue growth would have been 3.1 percent,
slightly below the 3.4 percent revised revenue growth pro-
jected in November. Income tax revenues were up a bet-
ter-than-expected 5.1 percent.
In early February, Governor Lincoln Almond pro-
posed a $25.1 million supplemental spending adjustment
to the F¥99 budget enacted last June. If the adjustment isenacted, FY99 own-source expenditures will be 10.7 per-
cent above the $2.54 billion FY98 budget. Also in Febru-
ary, the governor proposed $2.9 billion in own-source
expenditures for FY2000, an increase of 4.1 percent
($114.7 million) over projected FY99 expenditures. Both
the FY99 budget and the proposed FY2000 budget are
balanced by the spending down of accumulated reserves.
Most of the proposed budget increase in FY2000 is
allocated to increases in local aid. The phase-out of the
motor vehicle excise tax at the local level will cost the state
an additional $22.9 million in FY2000. Local aid for edu-
cation is slated to increase by $31.5 million, while other
local aid would increase by $32.2 million. In addition,
expenditures for the public higher education system would
increase by $8.5 million.
Discontent with the local aid formula adopted by the
state in 1995 is intensifying among some of the suburban
school districts. Since 1995, state aid to education has
increased by an average of 5.9 percent per year. However,
the lion’s share of that increase has gone to financially
strapped and property-poor communities, such as Provi-
dence. After nearly four years of relatively small increases
in state aid to education, the suburban districts want in-
creases in both the amount and the share of funds that
are distributed to their communities.
Vermont
by Pei Zhu
For the first eight months of FY99, after a necessary
adjustment for Act 60 revenue transfers, Vermont’s tax
receipts reached $535.2 million, an increase of 7.7
percent ($38.3 million) over the same period one year
earlier. This result was slightly below expectations. How-
ever, the collections from two major consumption taxes--
the sales tax and the meals and rooms tax--were about
10 percent below target performance for February, ac-
counting for half of the overall revenue gap between Feb-
ruary tax collections and target tax collections. Diminished
tourism, attributable to a weak ski season and weakness
in the Canadian dollar, is probably responsible for this
poor result.
In January, Governor Howard Dean revised his FY99
spending projections and submitted his budget proposal
for FY2000. He suggested a 0.2 percent supplemental
spending increase in FY99 appropriations. For FY2000,
the governor proposed own-source spending ors 1.45 bil-
lion, an increase of 1.6 percent from the expected FY99
level.~ Based on these spending recommendations, the
administration projects a $23 million operating surplus
for FY2000.
With the general, transportation, and education fund
account balances full of accumulated reserves, the ratings
given by Wall Street for Vermont’s bonds are on the rise.2
And with substantial new revenues ftom three sources
expected for next year? the governor has proposed two
separate income tax cuts. The first is an across-the-board
8 percent cut in the income tax rate. The second is elimi-
nation of the income tax for fliers with incomes less than
$15,000. He has also recommended that the projected
FY99 budget surplus be used to reduce the state’s debt
burden, increase funding for higher education, and sup-
port other one-time spending projects.
Act 60 - Vermont’s education finance reform law -
continued to generate new developments. In order to avoid
sharing their revenues, many property-wealthy towns have
established private funds that will collect donations to be
made to schools, rather than taxes, from their citizens.
This developlnent has the potential to undermine the rev-
enue-sharing portion of the education finance reform.
Meanwhile, residents of Manchester have agreed on add-
ing a penny to the state’s 5 percent sales tax in order to
reduce property taxes and ease Manchester’s transition to
Act 60. This is the first town in Vermont to enact a local
sales tax. Finally, three property-rich towns--Dover,
Searsburg, and Whittingham--have decided to withhold
payment of their statewide property tax collections, which
were due on December 1, 1998, as a protest against Act
60. The state has resorted to legal action to force the pay-
ment of these collections, and the cases are still pending
in the courts. Seeking to resolve these problems, Gover-
nor Dean has appointed a special panel to discuss pos-
sible changes to Act 60. F~
2
3
The numbers are calculated by excluding one-time expenditures ($67.8
million for FY99 and $17.1 million for FY2000) from the total budget and
including special categorical state aid ($84.1 million for FY99 and $78.9
million for FY2000).
Standard & Poor’s raised Vermont’s bond rating from AA minus to a solid
AA in October 1998.
First, the passage of TEA-21 (Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21 st
Century) will provide Vermont with an additional $177 million for
transportation projects between FY99 and FY 2003. Second, the recent
tobacco settlement will bring Vermont about $26.4 million in new
revenues in FY2000. Third, the Department of Education and the Agency
of Human Services have worked to allow Medicaid funds to support
certain special education expenditures, a step that will bring the state
approximately $12.9 million in FY2000.GTB Formulas, continued from page 5
local school spending decisions, the degree of spending equal-
ity actually achieved in a wealth-neutral system depends on
the relative variation of these remaining factors.
¯ Second, in order to design a wealth-neutral system that
maintains local control, the local behavioral responses to the
matching GTB grants must be understood by state
policymakers. GTB systems create price incentives that may
cause spending patterns to deviate significantly from what
might be considered substantial equali~
In Vermont, Act 60 includes local option add-on spend-
ing, which is subject to a GTB formula intended to achieve
both wealth neutrality and spending equalization. However,
because of the price incentives that are implicit in a GTB for-
mula, local taxing and spending choices may be different from
those expected by state policymakers. Preliminary calculations
by Fiscal Facts suggest that the second tier of Act 60 may actu-
ally reverse the wealth / spending relationship. However, Ver-
mont policymakers appear to have intuitively understood the
distinction between wealth neutrality and spending equality
in designing Act 60. To satisfy the court ruling of substantial
equality in spending, Vermont imposed a mosdy state-funded
system, with only about 20 percent of funding coming from
the local option taxes subject to a GTB formula. FF
I~ew Englan(1 Fiscal Facts
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